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Abstract 
There is currently a global quest to decentralise government functions, which has resonated well with 
many developing countries. Ghana has over the last few decades embraced decentralisation in 
principle, as a way of promoting inclusive, efficient, accountable and bottom-up local-level governance. 
However, it is unclear how successfully this vision is being achieved.  Using a heuristic continuum as 
an analytical framework, this study conducted a literature- and statute-based politico-administrative 
review of the local governance system of Ghana to ascertain the extent of decentralisation. The study 
concludes that the legislative, political and administrative arrangements in place make it easy for the 
centre to usurp the powers of local authorities. 
Keywords: Ghana, decentralisation, recentralisation, politico-administrative 
Introduction  
Decentralisation as a tool for devolving power from the centre to the periphery has gained traction 
across the global south over the last few decades (Manor 1999; European Commission 2007; Lambright 
2011; McLaverty 2017). While there are varying degrees of commitment and success, the main drivers 
of this growing recourse to decentralisation in the developing world are generally agreed to be: the 
growing need to apply participatory development approaches; the need for efficient delivery of basic 
social services; and the collapse of the centralised state of the 1980s (Boex and Yilmaz 2010; Diamond 
1999; Eaton et al. 2011; European Commission 2007; Ouedraogo 2003). 
Ghana is one of the developing countries that has taken to decentralisation as a way of promoting 
inclusive, efficient, accountable and bottom-up local-level governance. The 1992 Constitution of the 
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Republic of Ghana, the (now superseded) Local Government Act 1993 and its successor the Local 
Governance Act 2016, together with a variety of other legislation, provide the basis for Ghana’s quest 
to establish a functional local and national governance framework (Ewool 2003; Crawford 2004). Since 
the inception of the district assembly concept (a system of local governance that seeks to involve 
stakeholders in decisions on issues that affect them), Ghanaians have embraced metropolitan, municipal 
and district assemblies (MMDAs) as the local institutions mandated to address their socio-economic 
and other developmental needs.  
The process of decentralisation is not devoid of challenges, however, as political, institutional and 
general administrative practices exhibit strong tendencies towards recentralisation in many African 
countries. Over 15 years ago Wunsch (2001) observed that decentralisation reforms in many African 
countries were stagnating because of the inability of governments to translate reform initiatives into 
implementation at the local level. He argued that reforms involving planning and capital investment, 
budgeting and fiscal management, personnel systems and management, and finance and revenue, had 
stalled due to reluctance on the part of central government actors to relinquish power, and/or the 
complexity of effective organisational redesign. He concluded that power transferred to local 
governments was most often recaptured by the centre due to loopholes, deliberately inserted in the 
decentralisation legislation. These loopholes included: provisions requiring ministry sign-off on 
budgets and annual plans; poorly trained local staff resulting in poor functioning of local authorities; 
poorly designed local institutions, militating against effective local decision-making; and the absence 
of an effective local political process to engender participation and accountability in the local 
governance process (Eaton et al. 20011; Wunsch 2001). As a remedy, Wunsch suggested cautiously 
crafted legislation that embraces good practice – although stressing that this could lead to some further 
reassertion of central control over local authorities (Eaton et al. 2011). 
Ghana’s decentralisation efforts seem to fit well into this analytical framework. An Afrobarometer 
(2008) briefing paper on popular opinions on local governance in Ghana found that only 43% of 
Ghanaians realise that local government authorities are responsible for the statutory tasks specifically 
assigned to them. The other 57% believe that central government is responsible – including for services 
as basic as operating a health clinic. The report concludes: “It appears that popular understandings of 
local government functions remain steeped in Ghana’s traditions of centralized public administration” 
(Afrobarometer 2008, p. 3). This misconception is understandable, since a number of practices affecting 
local government suggest the reassertion of central control over local authorities. Examples are the 
continued appointment of district chief executives (DCEs) by the president, as opposed to their election; 
the appointment of 30% of local legislators by the president; issues with recruitment, placement and 
personnel management; constraints on revenue mobilisation and fiscal autonomy; and controls over 
development planning and implementation. Ayee (2008) has argued that, although Ghana has a 
comprehensive local government policy that dates back to 1988, in practice the country still runs as a 
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highly centralised top-down public administrative political system. He even concludes that, where 
decentralisation is pursued, this is not as a tool for devolving power and improving socio-economic 
development, but rather as a means of realising “political objectives such as the recentralisation of 
power and legitimacy” (Ayee 2008, p. 243). 
Objectives and structure of the paper 
This paper therefore explores the decentralisation system of Ghana to ascertain whether it is gaining 
strength, stalling or recentralising, by reviewing a number of legislative and administrative 
arrangements underpinning local governance in Ghana. Given Ghana’s professed desire and enthusiasm 
to decentralise, however, any outcome of the analysis other than a relatively highly decentralised system 
will suggest recentralisation, as it will mean that all the reforms undertaken over the years are not 
achieving their goals. Following the introduction, the paper explains the study’s methodology and 
analytical framework. It then provides an overview of the decentralisation journey of Ghana, beginning 
from 1988, followed by a theoretical discussion of the concepts of centralisation, decentralisation and 
recentralisation. The analytical framework is then used to examine the state of decentralisation in 
Ghana, with this discussion followed by concluding comments. 
Study methods and analytical framework 
This study is a politico-administrative review of the decentralisation trajectory of Ghana. The term 
‘politico-administrative’ is used here to refer to the nexus between policy formulation and on-the-
ground implementation mechanisms. The analysis is limited to the progress and state of decentralisation 
under Ghana’s Fourth Republic, which came into existence with the promulgation of the 1992 
Republican Constitution. However, as the decentralisation drive started in 1988, four clear years before 
the return to constitutional democracy in 1992, occasional references are made to developments during 
that period. The study reviews policy documents, decentralisation reform initiatives, relevant legislation 
and on-the-ground practices, involving appointments, recruitment, placement and management of local 
government personnel to examine whether Ghana is making strides in its decentralisation drive – or 
otherwise. 
Analytically, the study uses the heuristic continuum developed by Hutchcroft (2001) based on his 
analysis of scholarly works on state formation and public administration. This continuum places full 
centralisation and full decentralisation at opposite extremes, although it is argued that neither of these 
‘pure’ forms exist in the real world. However, it is possible to determine whether the governance system 
of a country is relatively more centralised or relatively more decentralised.  
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Hutchcroft argues that a highly centralised political system will have an extensive combination of the 
following:  
1) local and regional officials are appointed by the centre; 2) there are few avenues for 
political participation at the local level; 3) subnational units lack their legislative bodies; 
4) there are no local bosses to challenge the authority of the centre; 5) decision-making 
authority at the capital is concentrated in the executive (or, if there is a national 
legislature, it has little real say); 6) the legislature (presuming it exists) has been 
established as part of a parliamentary structure, not a presidential one; 7) a significant 
proportion of national legislators are appointed by the centre; 8) there is a proportional 
representation electoral system (and selection of candidates within this system is 
determined by a national political party); 9) all political parties are national in scope, and 
capable of enforcing national-level decisions/strategies throughout the country; 10) 
bureaucracies are well insulated from systems of patronage (2001, p. 37). 
He similarly argues that opposite characteristics will be true in a highly decentralised system.  
Alternatively, Boex and Yilmaz (2010) have proposed six variables for assessing the state of 
decentralisation of governments, which are based on the technical and administrative dimensions of 
governance. Their framework identifies these variables as: political empowerment and decentralisation; 
administrative empowerment and decentralisation; fiscal empowerment and decentralisation; central 
government policy, legislation and institutions; local government institutions, management and 
administration; and civil society and the private sector. Eaton et al. (2011) have also proposed a range 
of (four) major variables regarding national and intergovernmental relations as an appropriate 
framework for the assessment of the effectiveness of different types of local government system. These 
include: the context and motivations underpinning decentralisation; the stakeholders involved in the 
decentralisation processes; the stage of reform vis-à-vis the baseline situation; and the roles and 
motivations of external development partners.  
As these propositions do not differ significantly from Hutchcroft’s (2001) framework, this study has 
chosen to use Hutchcroft’s analytical framework to examine the local governance system of Ghana. 
The framework (see Figure 1) shows that it is possible for a country to transition from a highly 
centralised system of governance to a highly decentralised one – and vice versa. However, most 
countries operate more gradually, seeking to either decentralise or centralise government functions. 
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Highly centralised 
1. Local and regional officials appointed  
2. Few avenues for political participation 
at the local level 
3. Subnational units without legislative 
bodies 
4. No local bosses to challenge the 
authority of the centre 
5. Decision-making authority is 
concentrated in the executive 
6. The legislature has been established as 
part of a parliamentary structure 
7. A significant proportion of national 
legislators are appointed by the centre 
8. There is a proportional representation 
electoral system 
9. All political parties are national in 
scope 
10. Bureaucracies are well insulated from 
systems of patronage 
Highly decentralised 
1. Local and regional officials are 
elected 
2. Several avenues for political 
participation at the local level 
3. Subnational units have legislative 
bodies 
4. There are local bosses to challenge 
the authority of the centre 
5. Decision-making authority is 
diffused among various branches of 
government  
6. The legislature has been established 
as part of a presidential structure 
7. National legislators are elected by 
universal adult suffrage 
8. There is a majority electoral system 
9. Political parties are organised 
ideologically and not nationally  
10. Bureaucracies are not well insulated 
from systems of patronage 
Relatively more centralised 
Relatively more decentralised 
Key 
Figure 1: Centralisation/decentralisation continuum 
Source: author’s construct 2017 
Relatively more 
decentralised 
Relatively more 
centralised 
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This study, however, makes use of only the first five and the tenth variables (six in all) in the framework 
for the analysis of the Ghanaian system. Variable 6 is not used because Ghana operates a quasi-
executive presidential system of governance and a constitution modelled on that of the United States of 
America, which seeks to ensure strict separation of powers. As such the legislature is not part of a 
parliamentary structure. Variable 7 is not used because all legislators gain entry to the parliament of 
Ghana through elections, as opposed to appointments. Variable 8 is not used because Ghana is a unitary 
country with a presidential system of governance. Finally, variable 9 is discarded because, although 
Ghanaian political parties are national in character, the aim, as captured in Article 55 Section 4 of the 
1992 Constitution of the Republic of Ghana is to enhance national unity and cohesion as opposed to 
enabling parties to enforce decisions nationwide. Consequently, these four variables are not used, 
because their likelihood of significantly affecting centre–periphery relationships is very minimal, if not 
entirely negligible.  
The local governance system of Ghana 
Although decentralised local governance in Ghana can be traced back as far as 1878 (Ayee 2000; Dick-
Sagoe 2012), the current system began in 1988, with the introduction of the Local Government Law 
Provisional National Defence Council Law (PNDCL) 207, (Crawford 2004). Initial attempts at 
decentralisation in Ghana occurred under the colonial regime, with the establishment of 355 native 
authorities, whose powers revolved around a chief or some local royalty. The native authorities existed 
basically to help British colonisers in the administration of the country, and their involvement in local 
government was limited. Subsequently, various legal instruments – the Municipal Ordinance of 1859; 
another ordinance establishing elected town councils for Accra, Kumasi, Sekondi-Takoradi and Cape 
Coast in 1943; the Municipal Councils Ordinance of 1953; and the Local Government Act (Act 54 of 
1961) – supported decentralised governance during the colonial and immediate post-colonial eras (Ayee 
2008). The thrust of decentralisation policy in Ghana as it exists today, however, has been to transfer 
power, authority, functions, competence and resources from the centre to the periphery, as a way of 
promoting popular participation and consultation in local governance processes (Ahwoi, 2010). 
The implementation of PNDCL 207 led to an initial increase in the number of districts from 65 to 110 
(and later to 216) within the country’s ten politico-administrative regions. The decentralisation drive 
then received constitutional legitimacy in 1992 with the promulgation of the 1992 Constitution, which 
mandated successive governments to ensure that Ghana remained a truly decentralised country. This 
approach was consolidated by various subsequent Acts, including: the Local Government Act 1993 
(Act 462); the District Assemblies’ Common Fund Act 1993 (Act 455); the Civil Service Law 1993; 
PNDCL 327; the National Development Planning (Systems) Act 1994 (Act 480); the Local Government 
Service Act 2003, (Act 656); the Institute of Local Government Studies Act 2003, (Act 647); and the 
Local Governance Act 2016 (Act 936) (Ahwoi 2010; Goel 2010; Dick-Sagoe 2012). 
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In principle, the decentralisation system of Ghana is characterised by the following: re-demarcation of 
various districts into smaller and more manageable local government units; non-partisan local 
government bodies; district assemblies mandated to perform legislative, administrative, development 
planning, service delivery, budgeting and rating functions; removal of obstacles to grassroots 
participation in the local governance processes; 30% of district assembly members appointed by the 
president in consultation with traditional rulers; a system of decentralised planning; and resource- and 
revenue-sharing between central and local governments (Government of Ghana 2016). 
The country is divided into ten administrative regions, containing 216 MMDAs. These MMDAs are 
further sub-divided into 1,306 urban, zonal, town and area councils and 16,000 unit committees. Each 
of the ten regions is headed by a regional minister, appointed by the president and endorsed by 
parliament. The MMDAs are headed by DCEs, again appointed by the president but subject to a two-
thirds majority approval vote among members of the district assembly – the highest decision-making 
body at the local level.  
According to Chireh (2009), Ghana’s decentralisation system is underpinned by the following pillars: 
• devolution of central government functions and authority to subnational government 
bodies; 
• fusion of decentralised governmental departments and agencies at the subnational level into 
an integrated administrative system; 
• reorganisation and restructuring of responsibilities, with greater implementation 
responsibilities resting on local government units; and 
• active participation of various segments of the local population in local decision-making 
and implementation processes. 
If Chireh’s description is correct, it implies that Ghana is making significant efforts to deepen local 
governance: through devolving functions, ensuring that MMDAs have oversight responsibility over all 
decentralised governmental bodies, and providing opportunities for participatory governance at the 
grassroots level. Practically, however, there are various impediments to these processes, which are the 
subject of this research.  
Defining centralisation, decentralisation and recentralisation 
Governance can be simply understood as the organisation of human activities in space and time. From 
a historical perspective, however, it can be argued that the sole purpose of this has often been to make 
communities and the people residing therein governable and/or manipulable (Scott 1998). 
Centralisation, decentralisation and recentralisation are concepts used by governments in different ways 
to organise nation states and make them governable. Centralisation is defined by Besley and Coate 
(2003) as a system of governance whereby decisions over government expenditure are centrally made 
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and financed from general revenues. It has long been argued that the modern state is an embodiment of 
administrative centralisation because “political relations radiate to and from a center, to cover a ... 
territorially demarcated area over which it exercises ... some degree of authoritative, binding rule 
making, backed up by some organised physical force.” (Mann 1993, p. 55). One way to achieve 
centralisation is through a system of prefectoralism: a governance system whereby the country is 
divided into various units, headed by prefects, who are expected to represent the central government, 
and who supervise all local-level actors (Hutchcroft 2001). 
Within the African context, Wunsch and Olowu (1990) and Gennaioli and Rainer (2007) have argued 
that most African countries are centrally governed, with a resulting lack of accountability, poor 
supervision and inadequate participation by the ordinary people in the governance processes. They 
emphasise that this ruler/ruled relationship also stifles dissenting views, resulting in flawed policy 
processes and errors of judgement in the overall governance processes. Whether this assessment is true 
of Ghana is subject to debate. 
Decentralisation, by contrast, can be defined as “any act in which a central government formally cedes 
powers to actors and institutions at lower levels in a political-administrative and territorial hierarchy” 
(Ribot 2001, p. v). Three main forms of decentralisation are identified in the literature. According to 
Manor (1999) they are 1) deconcentration or administrative decentralisation, 2) fiscal decentralisation, 
and 3) political decentralisation, also sometimes termed democratic decentralisation or devolution. It is 
further suggested (Manor, 1999) that while it is possible for each of these forms of decentralisation to 
exist in isolation, it is equally possible to have a combination, or all three working together, within a 
given system. In deconcentration or administrative decentralisation, local branches of central 
government bodies are created to perform assigned tasks, but local officials remain accountable to their 
respective central ministries. Fiscal decentralisation, by contrast, entails the transfer of fiscal resources, 
revenue-generating powers and authority over budgets to local-level officials (who may be elected or 
appointed). Finally, devolution, the third and most complete form of decentralisation, entails the transfer 
of functions, powers and resources to independent and democratically elected subnational bodies 
(Manor 1999; Crawford 2004). This paper is particularly concerned with administrative 
decentralisation/deconcentration and political/democratic decentralisation/devolution, although 
occasional references are made to fiscal decentralisation.  
Recentralisation has not been succinctly defined in the literature. In this study, however, it is perceived 
as a process whereby supposedly decentralised governmental structures are, covertly and/or overtly, 
recaptured by the centre through processes such as central government directives and administrative 
fiats. It is a process which deprives local-level actors of any initiative, by ensuring that they serve the 
interest of the centre as opposed to that of the local area. The result is that central government retains 
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control over local affairs by appointing government functionaries, requisitioning fiscal resources and 
controlling the staff base of local government bodies. 
Current state of decentralisation in Ghana 
Ghana’s laws seek to establish a system of local governance. The key objectives of decentralisation, as 
contained in the 1992 Constitution of Ghana are: democratic participatory governance; effective and 
efficient service delivery; and rapid socio-economic development. These objectives were to be achieved 
through a combination of mechanisms: a political process of creating regional coordinating councils 
(RCCs), MMDAs and sub-district structures; an administrative process of transferring staff from central 
government ministries to local governments; fiscal decentralisation; decentralised planning, whereby 
MMDAs become planning authorities; and the decentralised management of public–private 
partnerships.  
Some 25 years after the Constitution’s promulgation, it has become imperative to examine the extent to 
which the country is making progress – or otherwise – on the decentralisation journey.  This paper 
therefore now discusses Ghana’s current position, taking in turn the six relevant variables of Hutchcroft 
(2001). 
To what extent are local and regional officials appointed or elected? 
Of particular interest to this research is the method by which ministers and DCEs obtain their positions. 
Regional ministers are appointed by the president and approved by parliament. The effect of this is that 
their loyalty is first and foremost to the president, who has the power to replace them without 
explanation. DCEs, on the other hand, although also appointed by the president, must be approved by a 
two-thirds majority of the members forming their district assembly (the local legislature), present and 
voting. Interestingly, however, 30% of these members are also appointed by the president, which some 
critics assert is to ensure that his nominees attain the minimum votes required for their confirmation as 
DCEs. Despite some criticism, this provision was retained in the Local Governance Act 2016. DCE 
appointments help central government realise its political objectives at the local level, as its 
representatives work based on orders and directives from the centre as opposed to focusing on local 
initiatives.  
Beyond these two key officials, another important centralising influence is the fact that the staff of the 
various decentralised bodies are actually employees of central government. Their recruitment, posting, 
promotion, transfer and disciplining are determined by the local government service secretariat, a 
central government level public institution with the mandate to secure effective administration and 
management of the decentralised local government system in the country. The local government service 
secretariat is a creation of the Local Government Service Act 2003, whose head is, again, a presidential 
appointee. Basic functions such as organisational and job analysis, management audits, personnel needs 
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assessment and the development of personnel plans, professional standards and guidelines for different 
categories of staff – which should ordinarily be performed by MMDAs – are instead performed by the 
secretariat, a clear usurpation of the powers of MMDAs. 
Again, the governing body of the local government service is made up entirely of central government 
functionaries, namely a representative from each of the ministries responsible for local government, 
education, and health, all of whom should not be below the rank of a director. Other members include: 
the director general of the National Development Planning Commission (NDPC) or his/her 
representative; the head of the local government service; the administrator of the District Assemblies’ 
Common Fund or his/her representative; a representative of the local government workers, nominated 
by the workers; the director of the Institute of Local Government Studies or his/her representative; a 
representative of the National House of Chiefs; two representatives of civil society organisations with 
considerable knowledge of local government and decentralisation matters, nominated by the minister 
of local government; and two women with considerable knowledge of local government and 
decentralisation matters, also nominated by the minister. This means that the entire membership of the 
local government service governing council, is appointed by the president (Government of Ghana 
2016).  
This current system is, however, at variance with that envisaged by most Ghanaians. A report by the 
African Peer Review Mechanism (2005) established, for instance, that most Ghanaians would prefer to 
have elected as opposed to appointed DCEs. This claim was corroborated quite recently by the 
government’s own Constitution Review Commission, which established that an overwhelming majority 
of Ghanaians favoured a system of local government whereby DCEs are elected rather than appointed 
(Government of Ghana 2012). 
However, successive governments have preferred to appoint rather than elect DCEs because it gives 
them some hold over local affairs. Beyond the appointment of DCEs and regional ministers, other 
provisions such as the appointment of 30% of the members of district assemblies and national control 
over the audit of local governments further deprive MMDAs of initiative and autonomy. The authors 
of this paper argue, however, with many other academics, that a functional local government system 
would more appropriately be given a “clear mandate, architecture, functions, and considerable 
discretion over the use of its funds and implementation” of initiatives (Ferrazzi 2006, p. 4).  
There is a clear tension in Ghana’s structures. While the 1992 Constitution, the Local Government Act 
1993, and the Local Governance Act 2016 all support the creation of autonomous local government 
bodies, governments have managed to subvert this process, mostly by relying on the muted language 
(e.g. phrases such as ‘as far as practicable’) in which various sections of the legislation are couched 
(Ferrazzi 2006). Crawford (2004, p. 18) also observes that the appointment of DCEs is inconsistent with 
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democratic practices, because it encourages “upward accountability to central government rather than 
downward accountability to the local electorate”. 
To what extent are there local avenues for participation in the local governance 
process? 
Constitutionally, Ghana’s system of decentralisation does support popular participation in local 
governance. Article 240 (e) of the 1992 Constitution of Ghana states that “to ensure the accountability 
of local government authorities, people in particular local government areas shall, as far as 
practicable, be afforded the opportunity to participate effectively in their governance” (Republic of 
Ghana 1992, p. 139). Section 40 of the Local Governance Act 2016 also mandates MMDAs to create 
appropriate avenues for residents and other stakeholders to effectively participate in their affairs. They 
are expected to achieve this using ICT, town hall meetings, budget preparation and validation meetings; 
announcements on noticeboards; and site visits. It must, however, be noted that participation is a broad 
concept which can take various forms. These have been summarised to include information-sharing, 
consultation, service access, input to programmes, election, representation, association and 
collaboration (Institute of Local Government Studies and Friedrich Ebert Stiftung 2010). 
In seeking to actualise the legal requirements, a number of rounds of local government elections have 
been held since 1988: in 1988/89, 1994, 1998, 2002, 2006 (Agomor and Obayashi 2008), 2010 and 
2015. However, voter turnout has been very low compared to presidential elections. For example, 
turnout in the 2002 local government elections was 32.8%, while turnout for the 2004 presidential and 
parliamentary elections was 81.5% (Ayee 2008). It may be that turnout in local-level elections remains 
low because of the relatively weak nature of local governments in Ghana and lingering doubts about 
the impact of electorate votes on the performance of the system. It is plausible to argue that voters show 
little interest in local government elections because they are not genuine electoral contests, and because 
the most powerful positions remain appointive. 
The issue of participation in local government in Ghana is also highlighted in the area of development 
planning. The National Development Planning (Systems) Act 1994 (Act 480) governs decentralised 
planning in Ghana. This is structured to comprise district planning authorities, RCCs, and sector 
agencies, departments and ministries – at the local, regional and national levels respectively – with the 
NDPC playing a supervisory role (Ayee 2008; Cobbinah and Korah 2016). It is further suggested (Ayee 
2008) that important features of the decentralised planning system include the requirement of public 
hearings for district, sub-district and local development plans; the preparation of sub-district plans and 
the definition of planning areas; and the creation of joint planning areas and special development areas. 
Despite these provisions, however, Boamah et al. (2012) and Nunbogu (2014) report that planning in 
Ghana is still highly centralised and nationally oriented and does not provide adequate opportunities for 
community development and engagement. There is also a general lack of interest by the public in 
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planning processes, and the requirement for public hearings is not adhered to by local authorities. In 
instances where hearings have been held at all, there has been little debate on the issues (Ayee 2008). 
Participation of civil society organisations in local governance processes has not been any better.  
Alongside the seeming lack of interest in public hearings by local governments, another problem is how 
they are conducted. They are susceptible to control and micro-management from the NDPC at the 
centre, since Section 88, sub-section 5 of the Local Governance Act 2016 stipulates that “the 
Commission may, by legislative instrument, prescribe the manner in which the public hearing shall be 
conducted”. The broad wording of this power means that the participatory processes contained in 
various legislative and policy documents are equally subject to capture by the centre. 
Again, while local plans do need to be approved by local legislators, the 2016 Act endorses earlier laws 
by vesting powers of approval in the NDPC. It is the responsibility of the NDPC, under Section 86, sub-
section 3 (a) and (b) of the Act, to “determine the compatibility of district development plans with 
national development objectives” and where approved incorporate such plans into the national 
development plan. Sub-section 4 enjoins MMDAs not to alter approved district development plans 
without the prior approval of the NDPC. This implies that, although MMDAs are nominally planning 
authorities, their authority is recognisable only to the extent that their actions conform to the dictates of 
the NDPC.  
How independent are local legislatures? 
Politically, the main power-brokers at the district level are the DCEs, the local member(s) of parliament 
(MP), the presiding member of the local legislature and the district assembly members (elected and 
appointed). These various actors wield executive, legislative and deliberative powers. Article 241 (3) 
of the Constitution states that “subject to this Constitution, a District Assembly shall be the highest 
political authority in the district, and shall have deliberative, legislative and executive powers” 
(Republic of Ghana 1992, p. 140).  
As discussed above, the DCE is appointed by the president and approved by two-thirds of the district 
assembly members present and voting. The DCE wields political, executive and administrative powers, 
and in many functions represents central government in the district: presiding over executive committee 
and tender committee meetings; supervising decentralised departments of the district assembly; and 
leading the administrative and executive functions of the district assembly (Institute of Local 
Government Studies and Friedrich Ebert Stiftung 2010; Government of Ghana 2016). 
The local legislature is presided over by a presiding member, who must be a district assembly member, 
but who is voted in by other assembly members and must obtain two-thirds of the votes cast. Presiding 
members are elected for a period of two years, and are eligible for re-election. Presiding members chair 
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and run general assembly meetings, have voting rights, chair the statutory public relations and 
complaints committee and also chair credit approval committee meetings (Government of Ghana 2016). 
MPs represent the constituency and/or constituencies which are coterminous with their district in the 
national legislature. They are elected through universal adult suffrage from multi-party lists. They 
usually serve for a period of four years and may stand for re-election. MPs’ functions include guiding 
the general assembly on new legislation; identifying local problems and advocating for their resolution 
in parliament; briefing the local assembly about proceedings of the national legislature; and providing 
feedback to their electorate on programmes/projects being implemented (Institute of Local Government 
and Friedrich Ebert Stiftung 2010). 
Assembly members are at the centre of the decentralisation process of Ghana. They are the link between 
the district assembly and the various communities or electoral areas that make up the district. They are 
elected or appointed for a term of four years, and are eligible for re-election/appointment. Assembly 
members are expected to participate actively in committee meetings of the assembly; disseminate 
government policies and programmes to the electorate; consult the electorate on major policy issues; 
and articulate the views, concerns and interests of their electorate at assembly meetings (Government 
of Ghana 2016). 
Of interest to this research is the extent to which the local legislatures (district assemblies) are 
independent of central government manipulation and directives. It is suggested that the constitutional 
provisions which empower the president to appoint both district chief executives and 30% of district 
assembly members are a sure-fire recipe for central government interference in, and control of local 
legislatures. These arrangements enable central government to push its agenda on local legislatures 
through subtle manoeuvring by the appointed district chief executives and assembly members. Ferrazzi 
(2006) even argues that by these arrangements the Constitution conceptualises the functions of local 
governments as emanating from central government – as opposed to from the local governments as the 
case should be.  
Crawford (2004) chastises the local system of Ghana, arguing that the retention of presidential 
appointments and non-party-political local elections compromise essential democratic elements. He 
points out that the district assembly committee system is so organised that all sub-committees report to 
the assembly through the executive committee – which is chaired by the appointed district chief 
executive. The presiding member of the district assembly and the local MP(s) are not members. 
Crawford also points out that while this may be seen as furthering the principle of separation of powers 
at the local level, the effect is to vest power in an appointed representative of the central government to 
the detriment of elected leaders. On this point, Ayee (2000) is of the view that, both practically and 
legally, the presiding member and the MP do not represent any effective counterbalance to the 
dominance of the district chief executives. 
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The dominant influence of central government over local legislatures is further amplified by Section 6, 
sub-section 3 of the Local Governance Act 2016. This provision requires the president to appoint an 
interim management committee to oversee the functions of MMDAs whenever the Electoral 
Commission is unable to conduct district-level elections. Given that the Electoral Commission had to 
indefinitely postpone district-level elections in 2014 solely because of funding constraints, there is no 
guarantee that such scenarios may not be repeated in the future, and could serve as a convenient 
mechanism for the centre to usurp the powers of local governments. It would even be possible, in a 
‘worst case’ scenario, for the centre to artificially create such a need.   
Are local bosses capable of challenging the authority of the centre?  
Turning to the fourth variable in Hutchcroft’s (2001) analytical framework, in Ghana a number of 
constitutional provisions make it impossible for local bosses to challenge the authority of the centre. In 
terms of the theoretical powers and functions of the district assemblies – and for that matter the district 
chief executives – Section 12, sub-section 1(c) of the 2016 Act requires the district assembly to “provide 
guidance, give direction to and supervise other administrative authorities in the district as may be 
prescribed by law”. Similarly, Section 21, sub-section 1(e) requires the executive committee to “make 
recommendations on stated grounds to the appropriate Ministry, Department or Agency, for the 
appointment and replacement of officers for departments outside the control of the District Assembly 
where it is considered expedient to do so”. These wide-ranging powers are further affirmed by Section 
20, sub-section 2(c), which states that the district chief executive shall “be responsible for the 
supervision of the departments of the Assembly”. 
While power is concentrated in the district chief executives, the president has the power to override 
them, cause their removal from office or use other discretionary powers to render them powerless; 
implying a reconcentration of powers in the presidency. Also there are constitutional provisions that 
make it possible for the president to recapture or usurp these powers. Section 36 of the 2016 Act gives 
the president the power to cause the performance of any function of a district assembly to be 
investigated. Section 37, sub-section 1 goes further, stating:  
The President may declare a District Assembly to be in default of its functions by Executive 
Instrument if it is in the public interest to do so and may by the same or another Executive 
Instrument a) direct the District Assembly on how to perform any of its functions within 
the time specified in the Executive Instrument; or b) transfer to a person or body the 
performance of any of the functions of the District Assembly in default specified in the 
Executive Instrument.  
In a similarly arbitrary fashion Section 37, sub-section 2 states that: “the President may by the same or 
another instrument, dissolve or suspend the District Assembly for not more than one year or prohibit 
that District Assembly from the performance of certain functions specified in the Executive Instrument 
for not more than one year.” Interestingly, the powers bestowed on the president can be invoked at any 
time without any consultations whatsoever. This could result in the usurpation of the functions of district 
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assemblies by an over-zealous president for personal or political interests, particularly in a politically 
charged environment like Ghana.   
Nor is it only political power that has been concentrated at the centre. Development planning has also 
been centralised, and MMDAs can only plan based on the whims of central governmental bodies. 
Section 86, sub-section 1 of the 2016 Act states that “the [National Development Planning] Commission 
shall prescribe the format of district development plans”. Sub-section 2 stipulates that “each proposed 
District Development Plan shall be submitted through the Regional Co-ordinating Council to the 
Commission for consideration”. The question then arises: who should be responsible for the approval 
of locally prepared development plans – district assemblies or central governmental bodies? In the 
Ghanaian system, although the ‘in principle’ answer is ‘district assemblies’, in practice this 
constitutional provision renders those powers toothless, transferring them instead to the NDPC. 
Even more fundamental than the centralisation of political decision-making powers and development 
planning functions is the issue of autonomy over local law-making. Local-level legislation can have the 
force of law only if approved by the minister(s) – who acts on behalf of the president at the centre. 
Section 182, sub-sections 1–3 require district assemblies to submit their by-laws to their RCC for 
consideration and approval or rejection. However, as earlier indicated, the RCCs are headed by regional 
ministers, who are appointed by the president. Legislation approved therefore tends to reconcentrate 
district assemblies’ powers in either the president or his assignees, agents and actors. This situation 
weakens the authority of local governments and reduces them to implementers of central government 
directives and administrative fiats. 
To what extent is decision-making authority concentrated in the executive? 
Leaving aside the question of centre–periphery relations, decision-making at the central government 
level does not in any way support Ghana’s drive to decentralise. Instead, Ghana runs a quasi-executive 
system of government and, although the legislature and the judiciary are presumed to be independent, 
serving as checks on the executive, in practice several legislative, political and administrative structures 
combine to ensure that the executive remains a dominant force in decision-making processes. Simply 
put, decision-making authority at the capital is concentrated in the executive arm of government. 
Constitutionally, the president is vested with wide-ranging powers and is therefore able to run 
government business however he/she deems fit. Wereko-Brobbey (2013) went so far as to refer to the 
powers of the president, as guaranteed by the 1992 Constitution of Ghana as constitutional dictatorship. 
It is certainly the case that Article 58 (1) states that “the executive authority of Ghana shall vest in the 
President and shall be exercised in accordance with the provisions of this Constitution”, and that 
Article 58 (2) cements the sweeping nature of those powers when it states that “the executive authority 
of Ghana shall extend to the execution and maintenance of this Constitution and all laws made under 
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or continued in force by this Constitution”. The presidential powers are further reinforced by Article 
58 (4), which states that “except as otherwise provided in this Constitution or by a law not inconsistent 
with this Constitution, all executive acts of Government shall be expressed to be taken in the name of 
the President”. Judging by these legal provisions, Ghana as a country exists at the behest of the 
president, who has been granted unfettered powers by the laws of the land.  
In most presidential systems, parliament and the judiciary serve as checks on the powers of the 
president. This is not the case in the Ghanaian system.  Article 108 of the Constitution unambiguously 
states that: 
Parliament shall not, unless the bill is introduced or the motion is introduced by, or on 
behalf of, the President – (a) proceed upon a bill including an amendment to a bill, that, 
in the opinion of the person presiding, makes provision for any of the following – (i) the 
imposition of taxation or the alteration of taxation otherwise than by reduction; or (ii) the 
imposition of a charge on the Consolidated Fund or other public funds of Ghana or the 
alteration of any such charge otherwise than by reduction; or (iii) the payment, issue or 
withdrawal from the Consolidated Fund or other public funds of Ghana of any moneys not 
charged on the Consolidated Fund or any increase in the amount of that payment, issue 
or withdrawal.  
Thus – bizarrely – it is impossible even for the people’s representatives, MPs, to have a voice in matters 
as critical as the imposition of taxes and the utilisation of funds accruing to the state. 
It is clear that these legal texts make the executive arm the fulcrum of central government decision-
making. Certain legally-specified general administrative practices also contribute in no small way to 
fortifying executive power and influence. The president appoints all of the following: over 50% of 
cabinet ministers; the speaker of parliament; the chief justice and other justices of the superior courts; 
the commissioner for human rights and administrative justice; and a multiplicity of other roles engaged 
in national decision-making. It is true that it is impossible for the president to sack most of the people 
so appointed, as he/she is mandated to only do so in consultation with various stakeholders; 
nevertheless, it is reasonable to suggest that, once appointed to a position, individuals are expected to 
show support and/or loyalty to the appointing authority.      
To what extent are local actors able to influence bureaucracies?  
Finally, turning to the last variable in Hutchcroft’s (2001) framework, within Ghana the recruitment, 
placement and transfer of civil and local government staff has been entirely centralised, with the Office 
of the Head of Civil Service responsible for the recruitment, placement and transfer of civil servants, 
and the local government service responsible for staff within its secretariat. This practice effectively 
takes away from local authorities the power to control any persons in the service of local governance. 
It also contradicts constitutional provisions such as Article 240 (2)(d), and Article 37, sub-sections (1) 
and (2), which require the establishment of functional local governments, and mandates local authorities 
to “have such staff as may be necessary for the proper and efficient performance of its functions”. 
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Ayee (2008) has observed that the centralised nature of appointment, transfer and sanctioning of local 
government staff results in a situation of persistent allegiance of civil and local government staff to the 
centre. It also results in lack of control by local authorities over the tenure of officers working within 
their jurisdiction. He further reports instances where local authorities are deprived of key staff such as 
coordinating directors, finance officers and planning officers, among others, due to transfers dictated 
by central government agencies. 
There is no doubt that current practice with regard to the recruitment, placement and transfer of local 
government staff does not give local authorities the discretion and authority they need to take action 
against non-performing officials. Local authorities are also rendered incapable of rationalising their 
staff to reflect their functions, geography, clients, administrative and technological needs.  
Conclusion 
This paper has examined the legislative, administrative and practical realities underpinning 
decentralisation in Ghana. It has established, using Hutchcroft’s (2001) analytical framework, that 
practices at the local level are anything but decentralisation. While Ghana has solid principles for the 
decentralisation of government in a participatory manner, there exist significant deficits in 
implementation.  On-the ground practices – legislative, administrative and political – indicate that the 
local government system in Ghana is controlled by forces at the centre. Local government officials, 
participatory processes, local legislatures and power structures have been so organised that the centre 
retains a dominant influence. Important functions such as development planning and making and 
approving by-laws have been recentralised through laws that require ministry or central government 
actor’s sign-off before local measures can come into force.  
The legislative and administrative structures of Ghana do not support the evolution of a genuine local 
government system – because legislative provisions stifle the emergence of a progressive local 
governance system, and administrative practices are manipulated by central government actors for 
partisan political goals. Although the Local Governance Act 2016 is touted as offering local governance 
in accordance with the Constitution of Ghana, (by establishing a local government service and a national 
system for development planning; by defining and regulating district assembly planning procedures; 
and by coordinating, facilitating, monitoring and supervising district assembly internal audit activities), 
it is significantly challenged and limiting. The 2016 Act is a mere reorganisation of its predecessor, the 
1993 Act. Substantial portions of the earlier Act have been reproduced verbatim, and it remains to be 
seen whether progress towards genuine devolution can be achieved. Finally, the unitary political 
structures in Ghana also make it difficult for districts to function effectively on their own, given the 
paucity of resources and support infrastructure in the regions.  
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